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Paul Carter 
... we live in a world of ghosts ... 
Henrik Ibsen 
Man can stretch himself as be may with his knowledge ... in 
the last analysis, be gives nothing but his own biography. 
Friedrich NIOisZche 
I find myself in an odd position today, not least in relation to the title of this talk, crossing 
the line. I would like to be able to stand on one side of the line or the other; it would make 
the task of exposition easier, if I could, say, look back over travelled roads; or, on the other 
hand, look forward confidently, chart in hand. Instead I fmd myself betwixt and between in a 
number of ways. I have recently Imished a book, The lie of the Land, shortly to be published: 
it is tempting but it is premature to talk about it. I am in the crepuscular realm between 
rransmission and reception, and it would be a mislake to interfere with that process, to 
foreshorten a road no one has yet been able to travel. Why seek to rationalise what has not as 
yet even entered the wider unconscious? 
I find myself betwixt and between in another way: The Lie of the Land bas been 
something of a breakthrough for me. I found in it a way of synthesising a number of ideas 
that had appeared piecemeal in earlier books. I suppose you could say, rather formally, lhat it 
makes good the argument of the title essay of 'Living In A New Country', that there is no 
reason why the migratory qua colonial experience itself, the complex historical experience of 
being betwixt and between, might not generate a critical stance with theoretical applicability 
elsewhere. I think my conception of the 'ground' may do this: we shall see. Less formally, 
it's my impression that the experience of writing a book at once so localised in its topics, so 
generalised in its implications, bas been stylistically liberating; perhaps it's my way of 
writing autobiography in Australia. 
Having broken through, or at least threaded a narrow gap, I feel no desire to look back. At 
the same time, the radiating prospects ahead lack defmition; I am among them but they are 
inadequately known. and perhaps the brighter for being unnamed. It must be a modest case of 
what lhe historian of psychiatry, Henri Ellenberger, calls Ia maladie creatrice: if the latest 
book is the 'illness', then tbe sense I have of worlds opening up or beginning to cohere must 
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correspond to that 'euphoria' associated wilh the cure. There is an expectation, in a gathering 
such as this, to define poinlS of departure and arrival, to nominate landmarks, to identify 
promising directions. This is the logic of the path taken thus far: this is the logic of the path 
that opens before us. But t have no heart for that model of enquiry; I do not find that personal 
knowledge can be acquired in that way; and the strait-jacket of formal exposition, the 
construction of a mythic narrative recapitulating the chief stages leading to one's discovery. 
have always struck me as of little more than diplcxnatic value. 
Evidently these remarks are ambiguously betwixt and between in yet another way: they 
border awkwardly on the confessions of a writer. Am J one of you, writing aboul the cull ural 
producers? Or am I one of them, ocrering myself up to hypnosis, keen to have your 
suggestions as to what might be going on in my mind? What is the cure for 'enthusiasm'. 
that obsession with one idea at the expense of another, which Kant called 'vtsania', and 
likened to a man 'crossing the line' (i.e. the Equator) for the first time. Many of you 
yourselves have a foot in both camps; sometimes you agree to be the somnambulist; 
sometimes you pretend to be awake. This morning you are in another position: waiting to be 
hypnotised, you have to pretend to be awake. 
These are not entirely idle remarks. Tiley touch for example on the sociology of 
knowledge. Feyerabend's characterisation of shifts of scientific paradigm as periods of 
epistemological anarchy may be exaggerated, but it is the case that new ideas, perhaps by 
definition, are felt as marking a decisive discontinuity with what bas gone before. Later they 
may be fitted out with a genealogy, and the rent in the historical narrative sewn up, but at the 
time they seem co break with the past. 1bey do this not so much because they explain more 
of wbat is already known, but because they seem to announce an entirely different field of 
interest. I think that in a small way this was the case with my book The Road 10 BOiany Bay: 
there was nothing factually new in it, indeed, in its selection of historical data, it was 
obtrusively old-fashioned. Its appeal lay in its appearing lo open up an entirely different field 
of enquiry. 
Why this should have been belongs to tbe sociology of knowledge, but it bas little to do 
with tbe ·author'; and auempts to explain these kinds of evenl genealogically, in tenns of a 
progression of ideas from one point to another, are bound to fail. 1bey fail because they do 
not accord epistemological value to that period of 'anarchy',  that fertile experience of being 
betwixt and between, at sea. This is not an absolute truth; it may be no more than a 
temperamental rationalisation. Two different kinds of knowledge may be described. Prefacing 
his Meditations, Descanes explained bow he had thought that once in his life 'Everything 
must be thoroughly overthrown', and he likened the resulting loss of certainty to the 
experience of a swimmer out of his depth, being pulled this way and that by strong currents. 
His master in scepticism, Michel de Montaigne, would have understood this perfectly-with 
the difference lhat be felt none of Descartes' anxiety to reach tbe shore; his bedrock was 
mobile, shifting; be identified self-knowledge not wilh a well-grounded position, but with the 
twisting and turning pbenomenon of always partially-{)C(;luded self-consciousness itself. Two 
ICalper.uneniS producing entirely different know ledges. 
These knowledges bad different topographies associated with tbem. Descanes' monocular 
planarism found its fictional COJ,mterpan in the utopian narrative of his conremporary Gabriel 
de Foigny. On arriving in the Southern Land, he asks his hosts where the mountains are, only 
to be told that they have all been flattened. It finds its historical sequel in the ani val of Phillip 
at Sydney Cove: 'The Governor marked out the Lines for the Encampment. and to prevent the 
Convicts straggling into the Woods, be appointed a Provost Martial, a Constable and a pan of 
ye Soldiers to take all Men up. that were found out of Boundaries'. 1be idea that order was 
cognate with clearing the ground, with the eradication of local differences leaving only 
absolute oppositions between inside and outside, also entailed a psychology: de Foigny's 
Soulhlanders were hermaphrodites; Phillip's division of his men imo line-crosscrs and line­
holders created two races of half-men. But ultimately the half-men and the double-men suffer 
from the same paranoia: they cannot contemplate dialogue with the other. Locked up in 
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themselves, they are surrounded by abysses. 
Montaigne's topography is different, and insofar as it embodies a conception of 
knowledge as a dialogue across differences-the differences giving knowledge its object of 
study-is a distinctively anti-colonial environment. Not only did Montaigne imagine his 
essays as a dialogue with his deceased friend Le Beotie, describing himself in a way his reader 
might undersland, if he were his interlocutor's other: to glimpse himself at all, he bad to creep 
up on his thoughts unnoticed and capture them on the wing. Montaigne's Essays are, among 
many other things, pre-Freudian assaults on the unconscious, but instead of being conceived 
as a crossing of the line-between waking and sleeping, say (which, incidentally, Freud, 
following Fechner, seemed to imagine as the passage from one 'scene' to another, rather like 
going from the city to the country)-they are located non-metaphorically in a peripateia of 
uneven ground. The back-lrackings and zig-zags of country roads, and not the high road to 
Rome, model Montaigne's approach 10 lbe problem of knowledge. 
Montaigne leads a double-life: this is the condition of his self-knowledge. You could say 
that he sets up camp in 'debatable land', where the rhetoric of 'crossing the line', with its 
obsession for clearing away cloudy doubt, is not recognised. This interests me: it interests me 
personally. It expresses my own temperamental preference for occupying spaces in-between, 
and for hearing in them not one but two or more voices, not one narrative but two or more 
which in some way implicate each other. I lead a double life. I enjoy masks and foreign 
voices. In Baroque Memories doubling-up is a psychological principle, a vehicle for the 
expression of desire: it also detennines the narrative fonn of the book. The figures-they are 
hardly rounded characters-are not severed halves contemplating a Platonic reunion; the desire 
that draws them to one another is not nostalgic, but stems from the experience of occupying a 
historical ground that is doubled, grooved and folded, of living in two places at once. 
The phrase 'debatable land' recalls the chapter of that name in The Road to Botany Bay. It 
also conjures up the spaces in-between I have written about elsewhere. It has a definite 
topography, this terrain, one intimated by Colonel Light when he pointed out that in 
surveying the Adelaide plains, he had no convenient church spires to guide him, and generally 
could rarely see more than a few yards ahead of him. Before the clearing, the way ahead appears 
exactly as that, as a manifold of gaps, of criss-crossing pathways: a perception uncannily 
captured in the Port Jackson Painter's depiction of Phillip's spearing, where the sinuous 
woods to which the attackers retreat is not grasped and framed, tamed as a picturesque 
backdrop, but appears as active agent, assisting in their dispersal and radiating concealment. 
And not only before clearing: afterwards too. Perbaps cities secondarily nurture and concentrate 
space: their primary appeal is to multiply differences, constructing barriers, mazes, and to fit 
out their inhabitants with a double-identity, known and unknown. 
The appeal of these debatable zones-zones that are non-linear, tieing neither inside nor 
outside the line, is that they suggest different histories, and also different narratives. 'As for 
me', my mythical Australian genius, Vincenzo Volentieri, remarks in The Sound In-Between, 
'I would like to have a history of gaps'. And it may be that The Lie of the l..mul, with its 
focus on flightpatbs, its assertion of a connection between a poetics of the ground and the 
science of ballistics, is an answer to his prayer. Narrowing and widening gaps may have an 
erotic appeal-they certainly have an epistemological appeal, not nlerely crossing the line but 
breaking it in two. Doubles gather about gaps, as does two-faced Janus; two points of view 
are simultaneously glimpsed, and it is difficult to say which frames which. Nevenheless, the 
frame is a necessary condition of their coming into contact 
Gaps can of course harden into doorways and doors: a transitional zone can sbrink and 
pebify, so that an environment where many views circulate fluidly turns into its frozen relic, 
the mirror state of mutual suspicion and deepening hatred, a metamorphosis I have tried to 
describe in my speculative recoostructions of �e early history of European-Aboriginal contact 
and conflict along the Yarra. On the other hand gaps may simply be the way in which we 
inhabit the world: they may not be conceptual vizors imposed upon us, they may simply 
describe bow, as oriented creatures, binocularly and binaurally navigating our way about, we 
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actually experience our surroundings. This is J.J. Gibson's persuasive argument; and it 
follows that the denial of gaps, their subjugation to the linear continuity principle, is an act of 
colonial barbarity as much perceptual as political and military. Thinking of linear history's 
self-fulfilling prophecies, Benjamin reflected, it is lhings just going on that is the catastrophe. 
Thinking of colonial space, he might have said the same. 
Evidently I attribute a therapeutic value to the realm of the betwixt and between; nevertheless, 
and to stay with the psychiatric metaphor, I find that it is in general discourse rigidly 
repressed. Cultural criticism of a poststtucturalist persuasion might be expected to take a 
professional interest in the dynamics of the gap. But in my experience this is not the case. 
There is, it is true, an eagerness to cross the line, to explore issues of difference, and in the 
process to cross-out the authority of the continuous line; but a paranoia about the gap 
remains. The flight from one side to the other remains linear, however physiological the 
metaphors used to describe iL Any science of intervals is repressed. any idea that knowledge 
might be grounded exactly in the double life of keeping open a communication across 
difference, is largely tteated as poetic excess, if not an infantile regression. 
Instead the gap only comes into view as an aporia, an ideologically-symptomatic 
oversight that it is our task to remedy. And the remedy consists in filling it in; in rebuilding 
the fabric of our knowledge in such a way that it is incorporated, taken account of. There is an 
odd sleight of band in this; for in identifying the gap in this way, a light from outside is 
usually needed; but the light is no sooner pennitted entrance, than it is used to illuminate the 
task of filling in the gaps. Once the gap is filled in, the origin of the light is forgotten, and it 
appears to have been generated locally. These remarks thinly allegorise what seems to me to 
be the prevailing habit in Australian cultural studies today: there can be, or should be, no 
quarrel about our dialogue with the centres of European thought; what is less defensible, it 
seems to me, is the way in which theoretical insights are used adventitiously to identify and 
fill in the gaps in Australia's narrative of itself. 
The nationalist and insularist trend of much research in the humanities and social sciences 
in this country may or may not be politically expedient but it contributes to the very paranoia 
about them and us which, internally, it seeks to break down. Its apparently liberating 
assumption that Australia is, culturally speaking, debatable land depends on internalising the 
culture as territory nexus that that research might be expected to question. The debates may 
appear to ground us more locally; in reality they are ever more ungrounded, mystifying the 
sources of meaning production, suppressing the processes whereby ideas circulate, and 
rendering next to impossible the other half of knowledge, which is its return to the other. To 
repeat, these returns do occur internally, and often beneficially; but they occur theatrically 
within the uncontested terrain of the nation-state. And remain in this sense symptoms rather 
than cures. 
If a geographical fundamentalism infonns research, it may be because geography, 
notwithstanding the recent spate of interest in the historical culture of space, remains largely 
untheorised, another 'last frontier' perhaps. Take the primary expression of the discourse of 
earth-writing, the chart: historical geographers interested in the earliest representations of lhe 
Australian coastline, rarely if ever question the historical status of the coastline itself. 
Different vessels, surveying techniques and interests, produce different outlines; the outlines 
themselves articulate changing cultural expectations. If they are reliable at all it is as graphic 
representations of the boundaries of geographical discourse. More telling are the indefinite 
endings, the gaps, the provisional production of islands. But instead of pondering this 
debalable land. tbe scholars recapitulate tbe history of colonisation, mounting a narrative in 
which the open figures are progressively nuclearised and enclosed. In the process it is forgouen 
that the earlier charts represented places n�rone could inhabit: they represent cultural spaces no 
longer available to us. Just as we, with our internalised political maps, may have girded 
ourselves round with an exclusion zone. 
Oddly, the reception of social and critical theory here rarely seems to provoke a 'critical 
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stance'. Said has suggested that theories are what critical stances become wben they travel 
away from their historical point of origin. This may explain the cellular self-confidence that 
characterises the reception and circulation of (mainly) European ideas here: if critical stances 
can only gain admission here as theories, it is only as theories that they are likely to circulate. 
Evidently a fonn of colonialism is at work: thinking technologies are imponed to cultivate a 
generally barren terrain. It is an interesting question what is exported in return. But obviously 
this model of a cultural economy does not seem to me either desirable or indeed practicable as 
a modus operandi. Unless there is a dialogue, a recognition of the provisional nature of 
appearances, no valuable exchange is possible. The object of this scepticism is not to bold the 
line. On the conlrary, it is to resist the rhetoric of equators, and the paranoia of boundaries 
which, being continuous, are bound to be violated. 
There is more pressing reason why the betwixt and the between, with its propensity for 
attending to what has been left out, and its equally developed interests in the arts of mimicry, 
may adumbrate a critical stance worth respect. And it turns on that question of repression 
mentioned before. Consider the following scenario: our modem empires depend for their 
wealth on the possession of colonies. The colonies not only provide cheap labour and cbeap 
raw materials; they not only provide a useful social safety valve and a potent international 
bargaining chip, but they are also a source of ideas. Intellectual leadership is directly associated 
with access to 'facts': the greater the abundance of elhnographic, zoological, botanical and 
geographic data, the greater the likelihood that the nation possessing these will enjoy 
scientific and even artistic pre-eminence. At the same time it is a matter of pride, of national 
self-respect. to pretend that the cultural capital thus accwnulated bas been generated at home: 
the colonial experience is repressed, in compensation a genealogical narrative is elaborated. 
This not only 'covers the facts': it preserves the historical illusion of continuity, of a society 
evolving its own future out of itself, the principle of auto-genesis critical to patriarchy's self­
legitimation. 
This scenario is easily illustrated: Wallace, Darwin, Frazer, Nietzsche, Flaubert, Marx, 
Tolstoy-in each and every case the experience of colonialism can be shown to have played a 
decisive role in the evolution of their ideas. It might be more truthful to say that it was the 
pervasive fact of slave societies and an apparently inexhaustible nature, and the mystificatioo 
of the relationship between the high culture enjoyed in St Petersburg, Vienna or Boston and 
rhe low culture (and nature) of the colonies, that provided the nineteenth-century mind with its 
object: how to rationalise and organise these vast. apparently incommensurable human and 
natural phenomena? And the answer generally was: by inventing a new narrative. one that 
extended Europe's own genealogy yet furtber backwards. In neither Darwin nor Wallace. nor 
even in Lyell, is the spatial localisation of phenomena accorded any significance except a 
temporal one. So far as their theories of evolution go, it is as if Wallace and Darwin never 
stirred beyond the Home Counties. The testimony of Spencer and Gillen has no 
methodological impact on the organisation of The Golden Bough or Totem and Taboo: the 
Aranda are simply relocated as Europe's own primitives. 
With the work associated with The lie of tM Land behind me, I felt myself facing towards a 
nKiiating prospec� lhe brighter for being mmamed. Wbelher or not they are l>igbter remains to 
be seen; they certainly lack definition. But with that proviso in mind, let me make the 
scenario I have sketched out a little more specific. The discourses of geology, biology, 
psychology and history that we are heir to, which took their modem form in the nineteenth 
century, were, as I have said, above all systems of chronology. (1bey were also repressioos of 
the spatial.) Funber, and the two facts are related, they conceived of chronology in terms of 
stratifteation: the remotest past was the most deeply bmied; the most recent events lay closest 
to the surface. This was not only a princitJle for recovering the history of fossils and 
civilisations: it provided Freud with his conception of the psyche as a many-layered 
archaeological site. Knowledge, it is no exaggeration to say, became the art of cryptography. 
The modem science of signs, semiotics, we might say aphoristically, was the technique for 
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displacing the spatial to the temporal and fitting it out with an unconscious. 
Indeed, we might say summarily that the great discovery of that century was the 
unconscious, or what Matthew Arnold called 'the buried life'. 1be unconscious was something 
of a moving feast Treated metaphysically by philosophers like Schelling or von Hartmann, it 
could be assimilated to the Schopenbaurian Will; neo-Kantians could invoke it to save 
Darwin's evolutionism from unleashing anarchy on the world. Psychologically, it explained 
the phenomenon of hypnosis and the diaspora of 'mental deficiencies' associated with dreams, 
delusions, JX>Ssession, hysteria, and other fonns of neurasthenia. The unconscious surfaced 
conspicuously in the revised and amplified narratives of other areas of cultural and natural 
study: in ethnography, classical studies, embryology, ethology and, of course, it supplied the 
tacit dimension of Symbolism, and the explicit mise en scene of writers from Mary Shelley to 
Proust and Schnitzler. 
The unconscious was, in short, a necessary hypothesis: but why necessary? Why was it 
necessary to posit a bwied life, a previous or other existence locked away in the cellars of the 
European imaginary, always there but fonnerly ignored? What was the urgency for bringing it 
to the swface, repatriating it and handsomely acknowledging its historical role? Why was it a 
golden fleece, an exiled property whose homecoming was essential for the restoration of order? 
Obviously it was needed to complete the backward narrative, but why? The answer I would 
like 10 suggest sounds paradoxical, but I would like you at least to entertain it: it is that the 
cultivation of the unconscious amounted to an ideologically-driven act of repression. And what 
was repressed by being displaced to the unconscious was the pervasive historical experience of 
colonialism. Scientific recognition of the role of the unconscious in human affairs seemed 10 
be a liberatory step; its repression, Freud taught, was a primary cause of neurosis. Yet the 
theatrical unconscious, and the many dramas it provoked, whether it was the demonic Heinrich 
Schliemann at Troy having a vision of Pallas Athene or the modem wizard Jean-Martin 
Charcot at Sal petri ere deducing madness from his patients' mimicry of their own photographs, 
represented a collective diversion, a perbaps unconscious repression of a fact not at all dream­
like or infantile or primitive: that the delicious, not to say erotic, investigation of the sources 
of pleasure and pain depended economically and historically on the repressed other of 
colonialism. 
This thesis is not advanced as a 'theory'; it is put forward in an exploratory way in the 
context of what was said before alx>Ut developing a 'critical stance' towards the heritage of 
modem European thought, against which, customarily, cultural studies in this countty unfold. 
If these discourses generally, and the psychoanalytic literature panicularly, whether with a 
clinical or a linguistic inflection, raise up their sophisticated theoretical structures on a 
forgetfulness about their own empirical origins and perpetuate an amnesia regarding the 
external, historical conditions that provide their essential context; if they suppress that painful 
because usually violent exchange across cultural difference constitutional of colonising 
societies (whether in Europe or outside it), which was always the basis of the knowledge they 
sought to intemalise and re-represent as another manifestation of the European telos, then an 
uncritical adoption of their tools of analysis here may only duplicate an act of historical 
repression. 
In an odd way, by one of those sinuous side paths of the kind that Montaigne so liked 10 
explore, these global remarks bring us back to that rather more local debatable land wbere we 
were before. If tbe European unconscious unconsciously represses the colonial otber, tben we 
might expect it to be inhabited by a variety of figures whose origin lies less in the doubtfully 
visitable backward abysses of the mythic and its cast of archetypes than in the less solemn 
burlesques of colonial life. This was certainly the experience of tbose who took an interest in 
tbe most conspicuous collective manifestation of the unconscious, Spiritualism; and indeed, 
to a remarkable degree, the rituals associated witb the seance seemed to mimic those associated 
with the colonial encounter. 
Those swrunoned to materialise themselves could be various: departed relatives. historical 
figures; and, more libidinally appealing, instances of the primitive-carelessly arranged 
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nursing mothers, diamante-bedecked Indian slaves, ebony-burnished warriors. These pre­
televisual domestic charades, with their repertoire of disembodied hands, overturning gobleiS 
and discarded gannents, gave the participants a sensation of getting in contact with what was 
missing from their lives, the unconscious, say, but they also recalled the mysterious exchange 
of magically-charged mirrors, jade beads and macaw feathers characteristic of first contact. 
Also, as in the next phase of colonisation, the protocols of spirit communication were 
decidedly dictatorial. The medium and his suggestible allies put the questions, as did 
conquistadors, missionaries and government offlcials: spirits, like natives, were endlessly 
being asked their names, as if their existence were in doubt. Those who were credible were 
those who knew best bow to act the role assigned to them, and could discover amazing 
coincidences between their experiences, their memories, interesiS and range of acquaintance, 
and those of their questioners. If called upon to materialise themselves, they bad to imitate 
other expectations: to know how to slip through curtains, how to trim tbe lamp, how to 
throw a shadow on a frosted pane. Circus perfonners, conjured to occupy the debatable land 
between being and non-being, they had to mimic the spiritualists' melodramatic imaginary if 
they were to ring true. 
But that is the point: despite the pseudo-scientific objectivity of the proceedings, they 
offered a legitimate outlet for a desire of sympathetic identification. The transference that 
occurred collectively between those taking part in the seance seemed to model a different way 
of geuing knowledge; obviously, it also produced a different kind of knowledge. To judge 
from the serious interest that men like Wallace and even the writer of imperial romances, 
Rider Haggard, took in Spiritualism, it answered to a kind of loneliness they felt. a sense that 
the efficiency with which they internalised and rationalised their passionate experiences, 
reordering them into biographical trajectories, narratives and over-arching theories, prevented 
them from ever getting into contact with the material they studied so minutely, and whicb 
they sought with their taxonomies to fit out with families. But this breach in lhe myth of 
intellectual auto-genesis could hardly be admitted: publicly at least an interest in mimic 
doubles, in strnngely familiar voices and the cinematic dress-ups of dreams had to be tempered, 
the repressed, even as it mesmerised had to be resisted. 
In a chapter of his life-story called 'Psychical', the author of King Solomon's Mines, 
Rider Haggard, records a number of 'dream-pictures' that seem to him to have had telepathic 
origins. Among lhese is a series of 'tableaux' apparently recapitulating the history of 
humankind from iiS humblest beginnings 'in the mouth of a cavern· to the pomp and 
decadence of an Egyptian palace. Rider Haggard wonders whether these are proof of 'Racial 
memories of events that had happened to fothers' -an instance, it seems, of ontogeny 
recapitulating phylogeny in lhe psychic realm. These dioramic dream tableaux have a 
suggestive bearing on Rider Haggard's 'fictions of empire' as his romances have been called, 
but their interest here lies in the sequel: when Rider Haggard described them to Sir Oliver 
Lodge, a man who regarded the 'etheric medium' as equally amenable to radio and spirit 
communication, Lodge remarked disappointingly, that he could make nothing of them as 'he 
lacked imagination'. 
The men who, in the second half of lhe nineteenth century, interested themselves in 
mesmerism, in Spiritualism, in lhe occult. in table-turning telepathy and telephones, prided 
themselves on their lack of imagination. They stood firmly on lhe parquet floor of 
Positivism, interested in obtaining the indisputable facts. They declined to be taken in, made 
it a point of honour not to be overtaken by any fonn of sympathetic identification. Their 
position was not even fully 'scientific' in lhe sense of implying the furnishing of provisional 
theories. They peered to see with a child's eyes, without prejudice or the blinkers of premature 
rationalisation. The puppet others thus conjured up, with their hidden wires, their sub-vocal 
clatter, lheir dismal repertoire of circus-tricks, reflected-were tbe mimics-<>f this emotional 
(and spiritual) infantilism. These men so keen to cross the line into the country of the 
unconscious seemed indifferent to the emotional and aesthetic poverty of the environment they 
nonnally inhabited. Edmund Gosse reports lhat his father, a member of tbe Plymouth Brethren 
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and a marine biologist, took the Bible in its literal sense. His faith might have been 'fanatical' 
but there was nothing 'mystical' about it; it displayed 'a rigid and iconoclastic literalness'. He 
was, his son writes, 'devoid of sympathetic imagination'.  
But to return to that sinuous path: it may be that these socially-licensed encounters with 
ghosts were cathartic because they confronted, and for a while at least seemed to exorcise, a 
profounder devil-the devil that beset Positivist science's attempt to make contact with the 
necessary other of its own study; and the type of this blocked communication was, of course, 
the difficulty that the coloniser found in entering into the mind of the peoples he colonised. At 
the very least the scientific acknowledgement of psychic phenomena seemed to offer a basis 
for sympathetic identification. Commenting on the Kumai belief that their sorcerer or Birraarlc 
could communicate with ghosts, that his own ancestral ghosts visited him in dreams, Howitt, 
in 1880, commented, 'We should be loth to reproach him with superstition when we reflect 
upon the extraordinary resemblance between the proceedings of the Birraark and the 
proceedings even now laking place in the midst of our highest civilization at "spirit seances'". 
Generally, though, the ideology of the continuous line, which saw crossing the line as a 
kind of equatorial madness-Phillip's hastily-appointed janitors were in the same business as 
Charcot's white-coated assistants hauling off fainting women to the clulmbre de crises­
rendered it impossible to dwell respectably in the marches of the betwixt and between 
inhabited by doubles, where mimetically-elaborated symbolic gestures had yet to coagulate 
into unilateral signs. This was the appeal of the seance: vicariously at least, it allowed access 
to that world. Two books published around 1870, which, according to Wallace, were among 
the most convincing in showing the objective existence of psychic phenomena, rejoiced in the 
titles, 'Footfalls on the Boundary of Another World' and 'The Debatable Land between this 
World and the Next'. 
It may be that the late Victorian interior symbolically represented this drama to 
encompass the debatable land between this world and the next. The furniture of those parlours 
was also indispensable furniture of the unconscious: not by chance did the spirit visitants to 
the seance rust make their presence known by rapping the underside of the table. The 
mournful sideboards and wardrobes of those times were the medium's essential decor: but for 
their gloomy box camera recesses, their locks and sliding doors, their false bottoms and 
surprising mirrors, where would the 'Aiaddins' and 'Gypsies' be summoned from, where 
disappear 10? 
One has the feeling that the penumbral gloom of late Victorian interiors was inhabited by 
unspoken desires and was cultivated in response to the yearning for greater intimacy, for a way 
out of the bare light of the Oedipus complex. The table by the window on which resided 
specimens neatly labelled, letters and magnifying glass, might come into its own when the 
light streamed in. But in the evening, with the curtains drawn, another light dawned. In the 
underworld of night, whether elecUically-illuminated or protoplasmically punctuated by gas 
lamps, vestal flames cultured in alb-shaped columns of dusky glass, study could lake place: 
one could read repons from the colony; or bring one's correspondence up to dale. But between 
these two realms, which technology had made mimics of each other, the piano, the writing­
desk, the bell-jar with its feathered relics of Paradise, the Japanese screen-these belonged to 
debatable land. They could go either way: into the light or into the dark. 
That the debatable land of the psyche might resemble the crepuscular hour of a middle­
class Victorian household would not have seemed CKld to Schopenhauer, who glossed the 
processes of falling asleep and dreaming thus: as the brain draws the curtain on external 
sensations, so it becomes aware of the 'inner nerve-centre of organic life' -a transition 
comparable to a 'candle that begins to shine when the evening twilight comes'.  The mind is 
not a tabula rasa: it receives external impressions, but it also projects its own images; organic 
images and external impressions may bear some relationship to each other but, as the nature 
of dreams demonstrates, the organic life of the mind is a magic lantern capable of generating 
and projecting its own wonderful worlds: 'we see ourselves in strange and even impossible 
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situations'. Only when the subject dies to the external world 'can tbe dream occur, just as the 
pictures of a magic lantern can appear only after the lights of the room have been 
extinguished'. And the power of projection on to that mental screen is nothing other than 
what the Scots call 'second sight'. 
In this setting the seance might make sense; after all there was something seance-like 
about the Positivist eye floating balloon-like about the world, myopically peering into the 
incommunicable depths. Gosse, anxious to emulate his father's marine studies, recalls that 
one of his earliest dreams of knowledge took the form of a desire 'to walk out over the sea as 
far as I could, and then lie flat on it, face downwards, and peer into its depths' -a fantasy that 
displays the death-wish concealed within science's wish to see without being seen: to look 
down is also to drown. If nothing else the group suggestion required to turn tables offered a 
welcome relief from the solipsism of the motionless and glassy stare. To animate the table it 
was necessary 10 resign the philosophy of auto-genesis; in an oddly Marxian way it was to 
embrace the goal of changing things; and only the hypothesis of a group-mind, and the 
participatory immersion of the one in the many, could bring this about. 
This was the usefulness of holding bands: the chain of touching people seated round the 
table signified the resolution of this paradox. Puzzled by Plato's concept of the Forms, 
Pannenides wanted to know whether they were One or Many; was a Form present in tbe class 
of objects formed in its likeness? If so, had it suffered self-division? If not, was it really 
transcendent? The concept of methexis or participation proposed by Plato was intriguing but 
mystical rather than logical. But in north London parlours methexis was regularly achieved as 
the players round the lable became simultaneously one and many, in the process achieving a 
breakthrough into a higher, or perhaps lower, realm of knowledge, one that had previously 
been confmed to the underworld of the unconscious. 
Again these scientifically-licensed excursions into a realm where the intangible became 
tangible-not perhaps without a certain erotic frisson-had a context: they seemed to gloss, if 
not anticipate, late Victorian speculations about the origins of religion. The rings of studious, 
nervously perspiring men and women crouched about the percussive lable were a slowed-down 
parody of those chains of dancing maenads, the handmaidens of Dionysus, whose erotic figures 
beat the ground, making physically present the primitive 'group soul'. In tbe name of science 
they took part in a group-experience which not only recapitulated the beginnings of Western 
art and drama before the autochthonous genii loci were colonised, Olympianised and 
individuated as migratory cult-heroes: it found its contemporary counterpart in the totemic 
ceremonies of the Aranda. Or, better, they engaged in a thoroughly postmodem pastiche of 
these things-with this rider: that the pastiche was probably unconscious. 
These domestic interiors with their antic spirits were like scaled-up versions of old Pierre 
de Loutherbourg's eidophusikon: they were miniature theatres, miraculous illusions, where lhe 
other 'scene' of colonialism was darkly represented. An enlarged account along these lines 
might be a useful corrective to Bache lard's wonderfully poetic evocations of similar spaces in 
France: for the histcries these rooms contained were not only cosmic but colonial, fateful in a 
more than individual sense. If they raised the solitary dreamer up, so that be could seem to be 
a visitor to a distant planet, they also dragged him down with their collection of lengthening 
shadows and airless retreats. Their physical enclosure mirrored-doubled and legitimated-his 
own ideological and historical enclosure. But these facts did not find their significance in lhe 
unconscious; they were not to be grounded in a new pseudo-archaeology of the mind. Tbey had 
entirely historical provenances, in the economy of imperialism, an economy that shared with 
capitalism a mystification of its own ground, the roots of its authority and power in 
colonialism. 
Wherever the colonisers went, they were mainly interested in hearing themselves speak; 
the mirrors they handed over were a deception, beguiling the time until reinforcements landed. 
Even in the bush the newcomers looked through windows and imagined doors. The pioneer 
ethnographer no sooner collected his native informants than be quickly put up his other 
camera, the collapsible writing table. and began writing. Sheet by sheet, surface after surface, 
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be covered and removed-but the table, magically, did not seem sensibly diminished. The 
colonial explorers and writers had, from the point of view of the colonised, no need to indulge 
in facile trickery: it was not necessary to make tables leap and tremble. The tables were turned 
merely by the act of writing all this down, substituting anolher ground for the one they one­
sidedly occupied-and, in the process, pretending the square of light did not cast a shadow­
and that the shadow, the soul of the shadow, needed that native ground in which to dwell. 
By one route or another I seem to have circulated, like Montaigne's topographer, managing, 
the further I go, not to delimit but, if anything, to unfold further the extent of debatable land. 
In any case, in illustrating lhe value of adopting a critical stance towards the explanatory 
models invoked in a culture like ours which, unlike those it has spasmodically mimicked, has 
never been able fully to deny its colonial constitution, I have also found myself coming back 
again to themes that permeate The Lie of the Land, and in particular to lhe question of how 
would·be postcolonial polities may have to ground their knowledges, lheir master·narratives, 
differently, not least in a reconceptualisation of the ground; one where, as I have hinted, lhe 
betwixt and between of debatable land may tum out to intimate a rather different dynamic of 
social relations and psychic economies. 
In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, reviewing what he calls 'mental 
deficiencies in lhe Cognitive Power', Immanuel Kant remarks, 'We also say of someone 
whose mind has stepped over the border: 'He has crossed the line', just as if a man who 
crosses lhe equator for lhe first time were in danger of losing his understanding'. Lyotard, 
critical of Kant, suggests that what Kant took as signs of psychic disorder are from a 
phenomenological perspective symptoms of sanity. The sufferer from vesania, or deranged 
reason, 'is', Kant writes, 'transferred to a quite different standpoint...and from it sees all 
objects differently ... just as a mountainous landscape sketched from an aereal perspective calls 
forth a quite different judgement about the region than when it is viewed from lhe plain'. 
From a bird's point of view, Lyotard remarks, it is the plains·dweller who seems to be the 
victim of systematic madness; he notes correctly that alienation or estrangement is a 
'precondition for landscape' -a point supported by the fact lhat lhe modern concept of 
landscape emerges as a key rhetorical term in the vocabulary of unprecedented internal as well 
as extema.l colonisation. 
But even Lyotard's meditation remains, metaphysically·speaking, European: his 
'landscape' is less historical lhen psychic, internalised ralher than extemalised. h is not lhe 
site of history; it more resembles a cinema screen. To escape its blank estrangement is to give 
it a 'face', as tbe lover gives lhe countenance of his and her beloved a face. Only in Ibis way, 
he suggests, can we avoid the estrangement the townsman feels in viewing lhe countryside, 
the alienation the fanner experiences in lhe city. But the movement itself, between different 
places, the ground of that exchange of views, never surfaces in his meditation. The 
embodiment of Lyotard's roving eye remains the flaneur. Even lhe opposition between town 
and country is characteristically European or symbolic. It recalls Gustav Fechner's remark that 
the difference between the waking and the dream state might be aptly compared to the different 
kinds of life a man leads in town and in lhe country-a suggestion taken up in Freud's 
distinction between the different 'scenes of action' of the Conscious and the Unconscious. 
Lyotard diagnoses the paranoia at the heart of Kant's spatial metaphors of mental illness. 
If Kant associates 'crossing the line' with obsessiveness, an irrational attention to one line of 
reasoning at lhe expense of taking a comprehensive view of things, it is because be finds 
mimicked tbere the linear cast of his own reason. Kant may appear to occupy tbe agora of 
reason, may appear to ground his conception of the world in lhe levelled clearing of common 
understanding, but he forgets the destruction of other viewpoints-what I have referred to as 
'lhe lie of lhe land' -integral to lhe construction of his pan·optic enclosure. Kant cannot 
imagine, for example, a logic that is curvilinear, discontinuous, even, in the technical sense, 
chaotic and local. But Lyotard, allhough be makes effective rhetorical use of Kant's psycho-­
spatial metaphor, does not try to map it to any environment we might inhabit. What is lhe 
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equivalent in our experience of the "aerialist' or the bird's...eye view? Redon's monocular 
balloons perhaps, floating listlessly over Paris? As Lefebvre has pointed out. the 
spatialisation of discourse characteristic of both the psychoanalytic and poststructuralist 
literature remains rhetorical or, in my terms, ungrounded: and when it is 'grounded', when a 
city, say, is modelled in terms of its vocabulary of abysses, cut-de-sacs, attics and cellars, it 
turns out to be a ruin, an abandoned site where memories may linger but hardly men and 
women. 
What would it be like for our collective knowledge of ourselves to take the lie of the land 
seriously as the 'grom1d' of our knowledge? What kinds of experience would become available 
to study and historical interpretation if, instead of equating a well-founded historical narrative 
with an artificially cleared and flattened space, we constructed it with respect 10 lbe cbaracter of 
the environment we inhabit? What would happen to concepts like 'crossing the line', and 
indeed to the entire colonialist rhetoric of linear advance masquerading as an Odyssean return 
and a different way of staying at home, if we paid attention to the history and dynamics of 
human movement, consttued less in tenns of an effortless, frictionless exchange of one site of 
reverie for another, and more as a process of walking, a physical dialogue with one's 
surroundings punctuated by breath-patterns and metrically shadowed by continuously revised 
horizons. 
One consequence of giving back to movement a critical value is that we could abandon tbe 
special-pleading inherent in the current fashion for in-betweenness, as in betweenness usually 
presumes a binary opposition played out on conceptually level ground. As for the old 'ground' 
or Grund of Romantic speculation, it would cease to be a given; its oddly unresolved 
association with the physical ground beneath our feet would be questioned. We might find that 
Heidegger' s identification of the clearing of knowledge with a transcendental groundlessness 
becomes gratuitous, and arises from an impoverished concept of ground, which is implicitly 
imperialist and assimilates it to ideas of land and territory. More immediately germane to our 
conference, in The Lie of the Land I have suggesled that this conceptual shifting of the gromtd 
is important if debate surrounding the definition of postcolonial polities and communities is 
not to recapitulate, and remobilise, whether or not unconsciously, the linearist and centralist 
ideological frames of reference that characterise colonialist thougbL 
There might be other implications too: inhabiting debatable land where aitical stances 
were consttued not as theoretical border-posts but as vehicles of exchange across difference 
would certainly seem to imply different shapes of writing corresponding to the differently 
revealed topography. Said made the point in Culture and Imperialism that the emergence of 
self-consciously postcolonial cultures depended not only on a complex set of political 
negotiations across difference, entailing perhaps the institution of contrapuntal perspectives: it 
meant evolving new lilerary (and by extension artistic) fonns appropriate ·to this new 
condition, and be praised the Peruvian novelist Llosa for producing books that employ ·a 
particular son of nomadic, migratory and anti-narrative energy'. 
That may not be very precise, and I would want to emphasise the migratory rather than 
the nomadic; but still in a more modest arena, this was exactly the object of Living in a New 
Country, to create an anti-narrative history, centring in this case on a mythic nationalist hero, 
against whose parodically progressive biography the book could emerge contrapuntally, in 
fugal arrangements producing transformations as much generic as thematic. Implicitly critical 
of the cryptographic visualism that understands cullllr3l analysis as a more or less ingenious 
interpretation of signs, tbe book's central point was made in the remark, 'To explore is not to 
clear away uncenainties, but to add to them'. 
In The Sound In-Between the critical dialogue between fictive and non-fictive modes was 
made visually explicit: an image designed for. lhe installation of my 'Mirror States', a wort 
for four voices designed as a renaming of the Yarra River, marked the place in the book where 
the outward narrative of the first half slarted to reflect on itself and, as Borges found when be 
looked deep into the mirror, instead of repeating itself back to front, began to evolve shapes 
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that. although approaching little by little seemed to differ from their originals; or which, 
always ccming from the other side were themselves also originals. 
Baroque Memories treats the fonnal question of the self-differing double narrative as a 
psychological mechanism, mirroring the migrant condition. Martin Magellan, the ocean-going 
short-story writer, realises that from a land-lubber's point of view, his stories, fragmentary, 
beginning in the middle, going off at a tangent. must appear neurotic, or infantile, as if be had 
crossed the line, was all at sea, ungrounded. From a different perspective, alive to the rise and 
fall of tbe ocean's surface, which responds to winds and currents, an obsession with history's 
mythic lines of latitude and longitude was the clearest sign of vesania. To be well grounded, 
according to Magellan, was to know bow to move, to incorporate the lie of the land (and sea) 
emotionally: it was to live in the gaps, 10 study beginnings without a nostalgia for endings. 
It is a fear of gaps that precipitates tbe crisis in the life of Magellan's historical, and 
fictional alter-ego, Christopher Column. Intemalising his culture's linear paranoia, its deep 
fear of intervals, discontinuities and redoubling folds, Christopher can only envisage the 
ending in terms of a return to his point of origin; any other form of arrival he associates with 
deatb: 
His sea was always rising to meet him. No matter bow skilfully he navigated 
towards its upper rim he would never reach it. He knew that the nearer he drew to the 
edge, the more tightly it would coil above his head. He knew that if he ever glimpsed 
the beyond, the horizon would rise up and break over him like a wave. 
It seems to me that I have returned to the realm of the betwixt and between, or at least to 
the twilight realm of the author. And perhaps this was intentional. When I reflected on the 
flattering invitation to deliver this lecture, I was aware of the difficulty of finding a voice, a 
single position or persona I could, in the interests of presenting an authoritative presence, 
comfonably inhabit. I wanted to find a way of talking about recent work in a way that did not 
betray its double-nature. Naturally I hope that this has not been a solipsistic exercise but 
suggests a dialogue with themes of the conference. I have indicated that I think it constitutes a 
critical stance, not least with regard to the conduct of cultural studies here. And you should 
have no illusion that these forays into debatable land are made from somewhere else: they are 
not poetic figures on well-tenured ground. A distinct politics attaches to them, reflected 
perhaps not altogether trivially in the fact that it remains impossible to find Australian 
publishers prepared 10 release my books here. 
This bas a very odd effect. not without its critical and psychological value: it reinforces a 
sense of operating within the culture as a double. What is the authority of such a figure? 
Vemant maintains that in archaic Greece the double represented a 'true psychological 
category': 'A double', he writes, 
is not at all the same thing as an image. It is not a ·natural' object, but nor is it 
simply a product of the mind. It is not an imitation of a real object or an illusion of 
the mind or a creation of thought. The double is something separate from the person 
who sees it, something whose peculiar characters sets it in opposition, even in 
appearance, to familiar objects in life's ordinary setting. It exists on two contrasting 
planes at the same time: at the very moment that it shows itself to be present it also 
reveals itself to be not of this world and as belonging to some inaccessible, other, 
spllere. 
Which is all very well for doubles; but in preparing this talk I was guided by two 
epigraphs. One was Ibsen's well-known, and thoroughly Oedipal, formulation, 'We live in a 
world of ghosts' .  But the other came from his near contemporary Friedrich Nietszche, to tbe 
effect that whatever knowledge we lay claim to, we give nolhing but our own biography. The 
question of bow ghosts acquire biographies here interests me, but as I hope I have indicated, it 
embodies a much larger issue about the direction and motivation of cultwal research. 
